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THE RIGHT TO DEFEND
PRO SE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to counsel is a modern-day reality in the prosecution of
serious crimes.' Nevertheless, a small but visible minority' of criminal
defendants asks to conduct its own defense. Whatever motivates a
criminal defendant to seek to act pro se,3 the issue of voluntary self-
1. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Supreme Court held that
the right to counsel extends to all cases in which the defendant faces possible incar-
ceration. See note 100 infra.
2. Although precise data on the number of pro se defendants is not available,
it appears that very few criminal defendants choose to represent themselves. See
I L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTs: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 89 (1965).
A Minnesota survey revealed that attempted waiver of counsel by indigents was
rare. Most estimates were that less than three percent of the defendants attempted
to defend pro se, and this figure was reduced after the trial judge fully explained
to the defendants the importance of defense counsel. See Kamisar & Choper, The
Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations,
48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1963).
Much higher percentages of waiver of counsel requests, however, have been re-
ported from some federal district courts. See Note, The Representation of Indigent
Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 579, 584 (1963).
3. Pro se means "for himself." Another term, in propria persona, meaning "in
one's own proper person," is often used interchangeably with pro se.
Different reasons have been offered to explain why a defendant would want
to defend pro se. One reason recently suggested is that of political motivation. See
note 4 infra. Several other reasons have been suggested. The defendant may believe
that he can do a better job than counsel. See, e.g., Burstein v. United States, 178
F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1950). Sometimes the defendant may want to plead guilty to
"get it over with." See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN CoURTs
204 (1955) [hereinafter cited as BEANEY]. See also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957); note 100 infra. The defendant also may believe that by defending pro
se he will, if convicted, receive a lighter sentence, "a hope which has often been
planted by the district attorney to save the time and the expense of trial." BEANEY
204. Other defendants may have a blind faith in their own innocence and in
the infallibility of the judicial system. See Laub, The Problem of the Unrepresented,
Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 DUQUESNE U.L. REV.
245, 255 (1964). A defendant may regard a pro se defense as a means to in-
voke the jury's or the court's sympathy. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Helwig,
184 Pa. Super. 370, 378, 134 A.2d 694, 698 (1957). For a general discussion of
the tactical advantages of a pro se defense, see Comment, Self-Representation in Crimi-
nal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1479, 1504-07
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Self-Representation]. Finally, it has even been suggested
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representation in criminal trials has been presented often to American
courts.
4
The right5 of a criminal defendant to defend pro se at trial has strong
historical antecedents in nations with common law systems.0 The
right has been described as "absolute and primary,"' "basic and funda-
mental,"'  and "inherent." Writers and courts disagree, however,
whether the right is protected by the United States Constitution."0
In the federal courts, a criminal defendant has an express statutory
right to defend pro se.11 While the existence of a statutory right does
that "Perry Mason" and "Owen Marshall" have created a "TV syndrome." See Garcia,
Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MIAMi L. REv. 551, 552 (1969).
4. In recent years the issue has arisen frequently in so-called "political" trials,
prime examples of which are the prosecutions of Angela Davis and Bobby Seale.
See Scale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); People v. Davis, No. 3744 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin
County, June 4, 1972), cited in Self-Representation 1480 n.6, in which a co-defendant
requested to defend pro se; defendant Davis was allowed to participate as co-
counsel, see note 53 infra. See also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (appeal by seven of the so-called "D.C. Nine"). For a discussion of
the pro se right as colored by political considerations, see Self-Representation 1502-04.
5. Some courts have used the term "pro se right" without holding that the
"right" is founded on any constitutional or statutory provision. See, e.g., People v.
Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 461, 499 P.2d 489, 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, 241 (1972). Since
many courts have adopted this terminology, it will be used in this Note with the
understanding that the term "pro se right" does not assume that the legal ability
to defend pro se necessarily has a constitutional or statutory basis.
6. In thirteenth-century England, for example, the judicial procedure "required
of a litigant that he should appear before the court in his own person and conduct
his own cause in his own words." 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH COMMON LAw 211 (2d ed. 1899).
In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, pro-
vided "that in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage
their own causes personally ...."
Thus the court in United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009, 1018 (E.D. Tenn.),
aff'd, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966), noted that the pro se right has "long been
recognized."
7. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
8. Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F. Supp. 934, 937 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 260
F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 946 (1959).
9. People v. Sinko, 21 Ill. 2d 23, 25, 171 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1960).
10. See, e.g., Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due
Process, 54 MwN. L. Rv. 1175 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Grano]; Note, People v.
Sharp: Death Knell for Pro Se Representation in Criminal Trials in California?, 24
HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1973); Self-Representation; notes 25-27 infra and accompanying
text.
11. "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own causes personally or by counsel ..... " 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970). See also
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not render moot any inquiry into the constitutional status of the
pro se right,1" it often allows a federal court to avoid a final resolution
of the constitutional question. 13
The constitutions of thirty-six states appear to guarantee the right
of criminal defendants to proceed pro se.14  In the recent case of
People v. Sharp,'5 however, the California Supreme Court construed
the language of the California constitution to deny what previously
had been interpreted as a constitutional right of self-representation. 16
FED. R. CrIM. P. 44(a) (emphasis added):
Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have
counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his
initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through appeal, un-
less he waives such appointment.
Prior to a 1966 amendment, the rule was more explicit:
If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him
of his right to counsel and assign counsel . . . unless he elects to proceed
without counsel ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44, 327 U.S. 866 (1945) (emphasis added).
12. At least one writer believes that a constitutional, as opposed to a statutory,
pro se right is of more value to a defendant. Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 551, 554 (1969). The purely statutory pro se right is so burdened with
limitations that it has been suggested that the right can be effective only if grounded
in the federal constitution. See Self-Representation 1483.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972):
"In sum, whether or not the right of pro se representation has a constitutional founda-
tion it is patently a statutory right .... "
14. Some states allow the accused the right to be heard, or to defend, in person
and by counsel: ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10; COLO. CONST.
art. 2, § 16, CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; IDA-O CONST. art. 1,
§ 13; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13; Ky. CoNsT. § 11;
Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18(a); MoNT. CONST. art. 3, § 16; NEv. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 14; N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 6; N.D. CONsT. art. 1, § 13; Omo CONST. art. 1, § 10; OKLA. CONsT. art. 2, § 20;
ORE. CoNsr. art. 1, § 11; PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7; TENN.
CONST. art. 1, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CoNsT. ch. 1, art. 10; WASH. CoNsT.
art. 1, § 22; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 7; see LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9. Others grant
the right to defend in person or by counsel: KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10;
MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 12; NEB. CONsT. art. 1, § 11. Still other state constitutions
provide that the accused has the right to defend either by himself, by counsel, or
both: ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 16; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 26; S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 18; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
15. 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
16. CAL. CONSr. art. 1, § 13 (1879), granting a criminal defendant "the right . . .
to appear and defend, in person and with counsel," previously had been read as confer-
ring upon an accused a constitutional right to defend pro se. See, e.g., People v. Carter,
66 Cal. 2d 666. 427 P.2d 214, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967); People v. Mattson, 51
Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959); People v. Jackson, 186 Cal. App. 2d 307, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1960). In People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal.
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A resolution of the federal constitutional status of the pro se right is,
therefore, of interest not only to the fourteen states without constitutional
pfro se provisions, but to the above mentioned states' 7 as well, since
a federal constitutional pro se right may be applicable to state prose-
cutions.'
8
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the
constitutionality of the pro se right. It has noted, however, that at a
minimum, due process does not prohibit the pro se defense. 19 The
Court suggested in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann0 that
"'correlative" to the sixth amendment right to counsel is the right to
proceed without counsel.2 ' That suggestion, however, has never been
Rptr. 233 (1972), the California Supreme Court expressly rejected that reading
and held that there was no state constitutional right to defend pro se.
Section 13 was amended on June 6, 1972, effective June 7, 1972. The new
constitutional language, which grants a defendant merely the right "to be personally
present with counsel," cannot logically be construed as conferring any constitutional
pro se right. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 463, 499 P.2d 489, 498-99, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 242-43 (1972). The amended constitutional provision was not applicable
to the Sharp decision, since the "proceedings ...were all had before the [amend-
ment's] effective date...." Id. at 464, 499 P.2d at 499, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
For a discussion of nonlegal or extralegal factors that may underlie the Sharp
decision as well as the constitutional amendment, see notes 147-50 infra and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the Sharp decision itself, see Death Knell, supra
note 10; notes 124-35 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
18. See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S.
173 (1946); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States ex rel. Hyde v. McMann, 263
F.2d 940 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 937 (1959); cf. Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640, 678 (1948): "[The] Constitutional standard of fairness does not depend on
what court the defendant is in."
19. See, e.g., Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174 (1946):
Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it derives
from progressive standards of justice denies a person the right to defend him-
self or to confess guilt.
Accord, Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957). In United States v. Davis,
260 F. Supp. 1009, 1019 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966) (emphasis
original) the court stated:
All that has really been said by the Supreme Court is that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not prohibit the right of self-representation.
Davis did not, however, pass on the constitutionality of the pro se right, and held
only that the right, whatever its basis, is qualified.
20. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
21. The Court stated:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with
a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that
go to the substance of an accused's position before the law. . . . The
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the basis for a holding by the Court.22 Moreover, a statement made
in a subsequent Supreme Court decision may have weakened the
Court's earlier "correlative right" language: "The ability to waive a
constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to
insist upon the opposite of that right."2 3
The federal courts of appeals are split on the pro se question. Some,
relying on the language found in Adams,2 4 have held that an accused's
right to defend pro se is of constitutional stature.2" Others have decided
Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his
Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open.
Id. at 279 (emphasis added). Reference to this "correlative right" was made in subse-
quent cases as well. See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); Carter v.
Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174 (1946).
22. The Court consistently has denied certiorari in cases raising this issue. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968); United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967); United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 957 (1966); United States v. Abbamonte, 348 F.2d 700 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966); Cleveland v. United States, 322 F.2d
401 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963); United States v. Bentvena, 319
F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963); Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F.
Supp. 934 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 946 (1959).
23. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). The Singer rationale
has been viewed as one of the major obstacles to recognition of a constitutional
pro se right. See Self-Representation 1488.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. The Second Circuit is the most unequivocal in its assertion of a constitutional
pro se right. Its current position was foreshadowed in United States v. Private Brands,
Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 957 (1958), which
found it to be "well settled as a general principle that an accused has the constitu-
tional right to dispense with a lawyer's help and conduct his own defense .... "
(emphasis added). Then, in the leading case of United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271 (2d Cir. 1964), the court found the pro se right to be implicit in the "bundle
of rights" provided by the fifth amendment due process and sixth amendment right-
to-counsel guarantees.
The right to counsel and the right to defend pro se in criminal cases form
a single, inseparable bundle of rights, two fases (sicl of the same coin.
Thus we find the choice between the two sometimes discussed in terms of a
waiver of the right to counsel, and sometimes in terms of an election to
have a lawyer or to defend pro se. Viewed in this light the problem is sim-
plicity itself.
Id. at 276. The Second Circuit affirmed its Plattner position shortly thereafter,
declaring that "the [pro se] right derives, not from legislative enactments or judicial
rules, but from the Federal Constitution." United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno,
348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
The Fifth Circuit has found the pro se right to be constitutionally protected on
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that the right is purely statutory.26  In United States v. Dougherty,27
however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
previously convinced of the right's solely statutory basis, 8 seemed
inclined to reconsider the question.29
Viewed from both the federal and state level, then, it is apparent
that the criminal defendant's pro se right receives varying degrees of
respect according to the tribunal in which it is asserted. United
States v. Dougherty0 and People v. Sharp,31 considered along with a
two grounds: as "correlative" to the sixth amendment right to counsel, Juelich v.
United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965), and as implicit in the fifth amendment's
due process clause, MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 935 (1959).
For other circuits' recognition of a constitutional basis for the pro se right, see Lowe
V. United States, 418 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1048
(1970); United States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165, 1169 (6th Cir. 1969); Arnold v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969).
26. In Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 911 (1959), the court stated: "The truth is that the right is statutory in character,
and does not rise to the dignity of one conferred and guaranteed by the Constitution."
Accord, Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966); Butler v. United
States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 838 (1963).
The Supreme Court arguably implied that the pro se right is solely statutory in
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86 (1948).
27. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
28. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
29. In Dougherty the court insisted that its decision in Brown v. United States,
264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959), left the constitutional ques-
tion unresolved. While the Brown court's comments regarding the constitutionality of
the pro se right technically may be dicta, the court used emphatic language to suggest that
the pro se right is purely statutory. See note 26 supra. The Brown decision has been
cited for the proposition that no federal constitutional pro se right exists. See, e.g., Com-
ment, The Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 TExAs TEcH. U.L. REV. 89, 90 n.9 (1971).
Since Brown was decided before many of the other circuits held in favor of a consti-
tutional pro se right, note 25 supra, it is possible that Dougherty is a partial reflec-
tion of the cogency of the arguments advanced in those later cases. The Dougherty
court acknowledged the "constitutional aura" of the right, but found simply that the
Dougherty case could be resolved by reference to the "patently statutory" pro se
right. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court
concluded that the statutory pro se right must be recognized if asserted timely and
accompanied by a valid waiver of counsel, noting that a mere fear by the trial judge
of potential disruptive behavior by a pro se defendant is insufficient ground for deny-
ing the right. Because the court reversed the defendants' convictions on the ground
that their statutory pro se right had been violated, the court's discussion of the consti-
tutional basis for the right is, of course, dictum.
30. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
31. 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972). See note 16 supra
and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the Sharp case, see notes 124-
35 infra and accompanying text.
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recent California constitutional amendment,32 emphasize the continuing
disagreement regarding the constitutional basis for granting a pro se
request.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Self-representation by a criminal defendant was the commonplace
mode of defense during the Colonial Period, and was a right often
conferred specifically.33 This apparently firm historical footing for
a pro se right34 suggests that the absence of explicit reference to self-
representation in the federal constitution requires explanation. One
author states that the right is so engrained in our history that it
simply has been taken for granted.3"
Another possible explanation notes that the Judiciary Act of 1789,30
granting the statutory pro se right, was signed one day before the
sixth amendment was proposed. The explanation suggests that had
the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel been intended
to alter the generally recognized pro se right, some discussion of
the matter would have occurred on the floor of Congress. 7 None
32. See note 16 supra.
33. For example, see the following passages, quoted in People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d
448, 454, 499 P.2d 489, 492, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, 235 (1972): Chapter XXIII of the
Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey (1677), stating that "all persons
have free liberty to plead his own cause, if he please;" the Pennsylvania Frame of
Government in 1682, providing "That, in all courts all persons of all persuasions
may . . . personally plead their own cause themselves; or, if unable, by their friend;"
the Georgia Constitution of 1777, which referred to the "inherent privilege of every
freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause."
34. Arguably, what the provisions in note 33 supra sought to guarantee was simply
a right to defend and not a right to defend pro se. Thus the Sharp court noted:
There can be no denial that . . . a person accused of wrong-doing was and
is entitled to defend against such charges . . . . Although the right to de-
fend is fundamental, our concern is with the manner in which that funda-
mental right is to be exercised.
7 Cal. 3d at 453, 499 P.2d at 491-92, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
Nevertheless, the cited colonial provisions seem so clearly to confer a right to
defend pro se that it is difficult to understand how the Sharp court was able to
"discern . . . only vague notions of a fundamental right of self-representation" from
an examination of them. Id. at 454, 499 P.2d at 492, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 236. At
a minimum, the provisions easily could be viewed as reflecting the importance the
colonists attached to the right. Hence, the Sharp court's somewhat cursory rejection
of the historical significance of these passages is, at the very least, questionable.
35. BEANEY 209.
36. Ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92 (1789). See note 6supra.
37. BEANEY 28.
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did.3 Thus the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Plattnera9 reasoned that in passing the sixth amendment, Congress
merely acknowledged its awareness of the layman's lack of legal ex-
pertise; hence, to aid the criminal defendant, the right to counsel was
supplied, an action "surely not intended to limit in any way the
absolute and primary right to conduct one's own defense in propria
persona.'40
While the Plattner court's historical interpretation is plausible, it
can be argued instead that the different treatment accorded the right
to counsel and the right of self-representation, the former being placed
in the Constitution and the latter being left in statutory form, was
deliberate and hence expressive of an intent not to make self-repre-
sentation a constitutional right.4 '
In contrast to the absence of any reference to a pro se right in the
federal constitution, the constitutions of many states appear to grant
that right to criminal defendants. 42  An analysis of one of these con-
stitutional provisions, the Tennessee provision permitting a defendant
"to be heard by himself,"43 was presented in 1871 by the Tennessee
38. Id.
39. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). See note 25 supra.
40. 330 F.2d at 274. This statement apparently seems illogical to one commen-
tator, who states:
After all, to defend pro se is, for whatever reason, not to defend through
counsel. These procedures are related only in that they are antagonistic to
each other in the usual situation . . . . Thus, if the right to counsel is in-
deed "one of the safeguards ... deemed necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty" . . . it is difficult to conceive how the right
to defend pro se, necessarily not "one of the safeguards" could, by virtue of
this opposite relationship alone, be a constitutional right ....
48 N.C.L. Rv. 678, 682 (1970). Another author states, however:
The problem with the logic supporting a view of the right to defend pro se
as merely statutory lies in the failure to recognize that the fundamental right
being protected in the Sixth Amendment is the defendant's right to an oppor-
tunity to effectively present his cause in court. The right to counsel is sim-
ply one of the safeguards provided to insure that a defendant will have his
cause adequately presented. It is not the only safeguard and is not antag-
onistic to the right of the defendant to defend for himself. The right to
counsel is but a tool available to the accused seeking to effectively defend
himself.
Comment, The Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 Tsax. TEcH. U.L. REv. 89, 91 n.10 (1971)
(emphasis original).
41. Self-Representation 1487.
42. See note 14 supra.
43. TEN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9, quoted in Wilson v. State, 50 Tenn. 232, 234
(1871).
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Supreme Court in Wilson v. State.44  At that time a criminal defendant
had no right to be sworn as a witness in Tennessee,45 as a result of
which he often had no means by which to offer his explanation of
the facts underlying the charges against him. The Wilson court
therefore reasoned that the Tennessee constitutional provision per-
mitting a defendant to be heard in person was intended only to
guarantee that a defendant would have some mode of communication
by which he could "explain the case made against him, in his own
way."" One author suggests that if this were the objective of the
early state constitutions, then the rationale behind the self-representation
provisions no longer obtains, since a defendant is now entitled to be
a witness.47
In the final analysis, it must be realized that the right to counsel
received relatively little attention from the early colonial govern-
ments.48 Thus, although the question of self-representation was con-
44. 50Tenn. 232 (1871).
45. The purpose of this rule apparently was to protect the defendant from cross-
examination, which was believed to violate his privilege against self-incrimination.
See Grano 1193-94.
46. 50 Tenn. at 242 (emphasis added). The court recognized that in some
cases only the accused himself was qualified to explain the circumstances of the
alleged offense. In commenting upon the Tennessee constitutional provision, the
court stated:
That provision was founded upon a profound knowledge of human nature,
and a close and careful observation of human transactions. An innocent
person is sometimes entangled in a web of suspicion by a curious combina-
tion of facts, which no one else can explain but himself. These facts unex-
plained may point unerringly to the prisoner as the guilty person. The skill
or eloquence of his counsel can not reconcile the facts proven with the hy-
pothesis of innocence. He alone may be possessed of the clue. He alone
may be able by a simple explanation of circumstances which now seem inex-
plicable otherwise than upon the assumption of guilt, or by putting this and
that fact together, to remove every shadow of suspicion from himself.
Id. at 241. It is by no means clear, however, that the court was convinced that
the constitutional clause permitting the defendant to be heard in person was intended
to confer upon him any right to conduct his entire defense.
47. Grano 1194.
Hence, it convincingly can be contended that permitting an accused to tes-
tify satisfies the concerns expressed by the early Americans who wrote the
state constitutions.
Id. The potential difficulty with this argument is that this historical analysis seeks
simply to ascertain whether a constitutional pro se right did exist, not whether it
would be created were the constitutions to be rewritten today.
48. BEANEY 22-24, 27. Beaney offers the following explanation for this lack of
attention:
The logical inference to be drawn is that the states were satisfied with their
existing criminal procedure and assumed that most criminal prosecutions
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sidered,49 there is no evidence that any attention was given to the issue
of waiver of counsel as a prerequisite to a pro se defense."0 Since it
is this issue that confronts modem legal scholars, 1 any historical analysis
of the pro se right may be viewed at best as inconclusive.52
I. ASSERTING THE PRO SE RIGHT
Judicial treatment of a criminal defendant's request to proceed
pro se at trial differs according to the time at which the request is
made. Therefore, whether a court will grant the request may depend
on whether the trial already has commenced.
A. Asserting the Pro Se Right Prior to Trial
A defendant who wishes to proceed pro se13 must unequivocally
would continue to be undertaken by state governments. Hence other rights
seemed of greater importance and more worthy of demand.
Id. at 23.
49. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
50. Grano 1194.
51. Whatever the status of the pro se right, it is agreed that a defendant, in
order to claim the right, must effect a valid waiver of his constitutional right to
counsel. See notes 55-64 infra and accompanying text.
52. At least two authors hold this opinion. See Grano 1192-93; Self-Representation
1487.
Nor is an examination of the English common law very helpful. An accused was
allowed to defend himself in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. BuANEY
8-12; J. GRANT, OuR COMMON LAw CONSTITUTION 5-9 (1960). At that time,
however, the right to counsel had not yet been recognized. Thus, while the prac-
tice of proceeding pro se may well have been tantamount to a right, the courts never
spoke of a right to defend pro se. See Grano 1190-92.
53. The rights to proceed pro se and to be represented by counsel "cannot be
exercised at the same time." United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d
Cir. 1943). Consequently, the defendant is put to an election to appear either pro
se or by counsel. Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1958); Shelton
v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 346 U.S.
892 (1953), motion to vacate denied, 349 U.S. 943 (1955); Foster v. State, 148
Tex. Crim. 372, 187 S.W.2d 575 (1945); 48 N.C.L. REv. 678, 684 (1970).
The belief is that it would be unfair to allow a defendant to gain the advantages
of a hybrid of the two rights. Despite the traditional view that it would be "undesir-
able" to allow a defendant to participate as co-counsel, Brasier v. Jeary, 256 F.2d
474, 478 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867 (1958), one author regards participation
as co-counsel as an ideal means of reconciling the two rights:
No conflict exists between the fundamental values of fairness to the indi-
vidual and reliability of the guilt-determining process in cases where the de-
fendant wants to participate actively in the conduct of his defense but also
desires the assistance of counsel.
Self-Representation 1482. Angela Davis expanded on this belief in arguing her cause
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assert his pro se right.54  If he does so before the trial begins, the
pro se right often is characterized as "unqualified." 55
The "unqualified" right is not, however, totally without restrictions.
Since the pro se right must be construed to give full effect to the
sixth amendment right to counsel, 56 the pro se right, even if asserted
before the trial begins, is curtailed to the extent that a defendant must
effect a valid waiver5 7 of counsel before he will be allowed to proceed
pro se:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-
whose life or liberty is at stake-is without counsel. This protecting
duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge
of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver
by the accused.58
to be appointed co-counsel:
[Mly life is at stake in this case . . . . I don't think I should be forced to
remain mute, [a] face behind counsel table, an abstraction. I should be able
to do precisely the kind of things that would tend to allow us to put forth
the most efficacious type defense . . . . I'm talking about being able to
make arguments, . . . motions . . .. objections, and being able to examine
witnesses when it becomes clear that I am the most competent person . . .
to do so.
Transcript of pretrial proceedings at 39-40, People v. Davis, No. 3744 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Marin County, June 4, 1972), cited in Self-Representation 1506. The court
granted Davis the rare privilege of appearing as co-counsel, although it emphasized
that its decision did not rest on any right to so appear. Self-Representation 1480.
54. See, c.g., United States ex rel. Jackson v. Follette, 425 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1970); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
55. The term "unqualified" is used in the sense that, assuming the defendant effects
a valid waiver of counsel, the court must grant the defendant's pro se request. See,
e.g., United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
940 (1963); Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
838 (1963); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd on other
grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). This is in contrast to the "qualified" pro se right
discussed in notes 79-85 infra and accompanying text.
56. Recent emphasis on the right to counsel may weaken the argument that the
pro se right is protected by the federal constitution. See notes 99-103 infra and
accompanying text.
57. "Waiver" has been defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The
ease of establishing a valid waiver varies with the particular right involved. For
example, the right to counsel cannot be waived without notice of its existence, while
the right to cross-examine a witness is waived simply by not exercising it. See gener-
ally Grano 1208.
58. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). See also Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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Since the courts must indulge in "every reasonable presumption '"
against the waiver of constitutional rights, a trial judge must "investi-
gate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before
him demand" 0 in order to determine whether a defendant has effected
a valid waiver of counsel.("
The Supreme Court views a defendant's waiver of counsel as valid
"if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. 0 2
The defendant need not, however, prove that he can meet the dangers
of the case successfully, 3 and the fact that a pro se defense turns
59. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
60. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948).
It is the solemn duty of a federal judge before whom a defendant appears
without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary
to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right [to counsel] at every
stage of the proceedings.
Id. at 722.
61. The court in United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964),
which held the pro se right to be constitutionally grounded, see note 25 supra,
similarly restricted the right by requiring that a trial judge "conduct some sort of
inquiry bearing upon the defendant's capacity to make an intelligent choice."
In United States v. Harrison, 451 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1971), the trial judge had
failed to conduct the requisite inquiry. Since there consequently was no evidence
showing a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, the court reversed the pro se
defendant's conviction.
62. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). The
Plattner court expressly adopted this test. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271,
276 (2d Cir. 1964). Thus, in United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1971), the court held the defendant's waiver of counsel valid, noting the trial
judge's conclusion that the defendant's "eyes are wide open and he knows what he
is doing."
In Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1048 (1970), the trial court repeatedly advised the petitioner of his right
to counsel and explained to him the seriousness of the charge and the poten-
tial twenty-five year sentence. Petitioner, who had received most of his eleven
years of schooling in a reformatory, consistently responded that he realized what
a lawyer could do for him but nevertheless wanted to waive counsel and enter a
guilty plea. The court, adopting the Plattner view of a constitutional pro ce right,
held the waiver of counsel to be valid.
63. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F. Supp. 934
(E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
946 (1959); People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 205, 417 P.2d 868, 872, 53 Cal. Rptr.
284, 288 (1966). See also People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 24, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 626, 629 (1967):
If the defendant wants to venture into the unknown, he must be allowed to
do so, if he is aware of the dangers that lurk therein. He need not demon-
strate that he can meet them.
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out to be ineffective is irrelevant to the issue of whether an intelligent
waiver of counsel was made.64
While the cases have established that a valid waiver of counsel
requires that the defendant have at least an intelligent appreciation
of the consequences of his pro se choice,"5 what constitutes an intelligent
appreciation is far from clear.66 Therefore, the development of uni-
form and objective guidelines to aid in this determination is desirable.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Duty, 447 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1971); Hodge v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969).
65. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160-62 (1957); von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); United States v. Plattner,
330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
In two circuit court cases which found a constitutional pro se right, the courts
did not articulate any "intelligent appreciation" requirement. It appears clear, how-
ever, that the condition was met in each case. See United States ex rel. Maldonado
v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); MacKenna
v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959).
See also Placencia v. State, 268 N.E.2d 613 (Ind. 1971), in which the court accepted
as effective the defendant's waiver of counsel, "that decision appearing to have been
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made." Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
66. The test appears to be substantially subjective. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), stating that what constitutes an intelligent waiver "must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."
A mere declaration of waiver clearly will not suffice, and an appreciation encom-
passes far more than mere exposure to the consequences of the pro se choice. Note,
The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MmNr. L. REv. 1133, 1144
(1965). Justice Murphy stated in Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 186 (1946):
It is no excuse that the individual is willing to forego certain basic rights,
unless we are certain that he has a full and intelligent comprehension of
what he is doing.
Thus one author misunderstands the pro se right and wrongly assumes that any waiver
of counsel, competent or not, is acceptable. Grano 1200-01.
Whatever definition of "intelligent appreciation" is used, a defendant's mental com-
petence bears heavily on his ability to comprehend the consequences of a pro se
choice. Various reasons have been found for concluding that a defendant is incompe-
tent to waive counsel. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (de-
fendant mentally incompetent because of narcotics administered in jail); McNeal v.
Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (mentally ill defendant); Williams v. Huff, 146 F.2d
867 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (minor defendant presumed to lack capacity); United States
ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 228 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (defendant possessed
low I.Q.); United States v. Vargas, 124 F. Supp. 195 (D.P.R. 1954) (defendant had
little education and was unable to speak English). See also Self-Representation
1490-91 (suggesting that the question of competence ultimately reduces to a de-
termination whether a fundamentally unfair trial will result because of the de-
fendant's apparent level of mental abilities).
A defendant's lack of an intelligent appreciation of the consequences of his pro
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In von Moltke v. Gillies 7 Justice Black formulated a strict waiver
of counsel standard for guilty plea situations s that would ensure a
defendant's appreciation of the consequences of his choice. 0 Although
the von Moltke standard has not been widely accepted, 0 the importance
of attaining reliable guilt-determination tl should favor the adoption
of a stringent waiver of counsel standard 2  Thus, whether a de-
fendant's failure to appreciate the consequences of a pro se choice results
from mental incompetence73 or from the existence of an intricate and
complex case,7 4 a strict waiver of counsel standard similar to the von
Moltke proposal would afford a uniform and objective method by
which to evaluate the defendant's understanding of the possible conse-
se choice also may result simply from the existence of a case so complex that no
pro se defendant could understand its intricacies. Thus, in Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S.
786, 789 (1945), the Supreme Court refused to find a valid waiver of counsel, noting
that the defendant's defense involved a question "obviously beyond the capacity of
even an intelligent and educated layman . . . ." See also Commonwealth cx rel.
McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964); Browne v. State, 24 Wis.
2d 491, 129 N.W.2d 175 (1964).
67. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
68. Id. at 724:
[A valid waiver] must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable
punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances
in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding
of the whole matter.
Some courts have regarded this standard as too stringent. In Arnold v. United States,
414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1969), for example, the court refused to apply the
von Moltke formulation, declaring that it "suggests a standard of perfection. Applied
literally, there could never be a competent waiver of . . . counsel." Instead, the
court viewed the standard as merely "directory to trial courts, emphasizing the impor-
tance of careful inquiry before a waiver of the assistance of counsel is accepted."
Id. In Carter v. State, 243 Ind. 584, 187 N.E.2d 482 (1963), the Indiana Supreme
Court did not feel bound by von Moltke since Justice Black's waiver standard was
not supported by a majority of the Supreme Court. For a discussion of the subse-
quent history of the von Moltke standard, see Note, The Right of an Accused to
Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1142-45 (1965).
69. Although the defendant's purported waiver of counsel in von Moltke was made
in connection with her entering a guilty plea rather than attempting to proceed pro
se, the suggested waiver requirements are totally adaptable to waiver as it relates
to pro se requests.
70. See note 68 supra.
71. See notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text.
72. The California waiver of counsel standard, note 135 infra, is similar in many
respects to the von Moltke formulation.
73. See note 66 supra.
74. Id.
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quences of a pro se defense.75 Furthermore, a defendant who meets
the standard will have an intelligent awareness of what he must combat,
an awareness which presumably will reflect his ability to conduct an
adequate defense.76 Arguably, only such a "fully competent" defen-
dant, 7 though he may well be a rare individual, 78 should be allowed
to proceed pro se.
B. Asserting the Pro Se Right After Trial Has Commenced
Additional qualifications attach to a pro se request when the de-
fendant seeks to dismiss counsel and continue pro se after the trial
has begun. 79  In this situation the ultimate disposition of the defen-
dant's request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, which
must balance the defendant's legitimate interests in proceeding pro se
against the possibility that a pro se defense would disrupt the trial
proceedings 0 and hence frustrate the public interest 8 in achieving an
75. In these situations, defendants would have to be represented by counsel. See
notes 122-23 infra and accompanying text.
76. Even if the pro se defense turns out to be totally inadequate, it has been
argued that the resulting conviction must be upheld in order to protect the pro se
right from abuse by pro se defendants seeking reversal on the ground that they
presented inadequate defenses, and that only where a "travesty of justice" has occurred
should due process compel a reversal. Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed
Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. Ruv. 1133, 1147 (1965).
77. One author has recommended classifying defendants in three categories of
competence: submarginal, marginal, and fully competent. Within this framework,
only the fully competent defendant would be permitted to waive counsel and proceed
pro se. Id. at 1145.
78. id. The Sharp court acknowledged that in "rare instances" a denial of the
pro se right "may truly offend the concept of ordered liberty." 7 Cal. 3d at 460,
499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
79. One case states that the right to proceed pro se may be "waived" by the
acceptance of counsel. United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970).
Whether this was the actual basis of the court's holding is open to question, how-
ever, for the court's notation that the trial judge was justified in concluding that
the defendant's pro se participation "would only serve to confuse an already compli-
cated trial," id. at 908, suggests that the lower court's denial of the defendant's
pro se request was based on traditional factors. See Self-Representation 1491-92;
notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Private Brands, Inc., 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 957 (1958): "[Ain accused's right to represent himself is
not so absolute that it must be recognized when to do so would disrupt the court's
business." See also United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th
Cir. 1965); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963); Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
693
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accurate determination of guilt or innocence. Consequently, courts
have refused pro se requests made during trial when the case appeared
too complicated 2 or when the trial simply would have become too
confused."'
While maintaining order in trial proceedings arguably may not justify
the distinction between a trial court's lack of discretion in ruling on a
pro se request made before the trial begins and the court's recognized
discretion in considering a request made after the commencement
of trial,"4 the courts nevertheless have affirmed this distinction."8
IV. THE PRO SE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL
A defendant who is allowed to proceed pro se can expect little, if
any, special treatment from the court. While one state court has held
that a trial judge must "actively direct" the trial by preventing the
375 U.S. 838 (1963); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950),
affd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); United States v. Gutterman, 147
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943);
Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Il. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); State v. White, 86 NJ. Super. 410, 207 A.2d 178 (1965).
In United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964), which held the, pro se
right to be constitutionally protected, see note 25 supra, the court noted:
We do not reach the case where a defendant in the midst of a criminal
trial seeks to dismiss his lawyer and for the balance of the trial manage
and conduct his own defense pro se.
Id. at 277.
81. Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 911 (1959) (concurring opinion): "It is axiomatic that more than the rights of
an accused are involved in a criminal case." See notes 96-98 infra and accompanying
text.
82. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 838 (1963).
83. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 937-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1950),
aff'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330
(N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
84. At least two authors argue that the confusion and delay caused by a pro
sd defense will result regardless of when the right is asserted. See Grano 1179-84;
Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. RaV. 1133,
1138 (1965).
85. To at least one author, the continued recognition of this "absolute-discretion-
ary" dichotomy detracts from the constitutional pro se argument:
[The dichotomy] imparts to the right to defend pro se an evanescent qual-
ity not entirely consistent with the actual and alleged constitutional underpin-
nings of the right, nor with notions of individual autonomy.
48 N.C.L. Rav. 678, 687 (1970).
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introduction of totally irrelevant evidence "so as to protect the ultimate
purpose of the trial,"s a court generally has no obligation to allow
the pro se defendant to proceed any differently than would his at-
torney. 7 The defendant does not "acquire the right to have the
court act as his counsel."8 Nor is the court required to explain
potential defenses- or give legal advice 0 to him. In short, the pro se
defendant "assumes for all purposes connected with his case, and
must be prepared to be treated as having, the qualifications and re-
sponsibilities concomitant with the role he has undertaken."'"
A defendant may forfeit his pro se right by engaging in disruptive
conduct during the trial. Even if the pro se right is recognized by
the federal constitution, the right clearly would "not extend so far
as to permit subversion of the core concept of a trial."9  Hence,
dilatory or destructive behavior will terminate exercise of the right.93
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE
A. The Arguments
The federal constitution does not confer any express pro se right.94
That the Supreme Court has never held the right to be implicit in the
Constitution ' can be attributed in large part to due process considera-
tions. One of the basic objectives of a criminal prosecution is to
ensure the reliability of the guilt-determining process,9" reducing to
86. Grubbs v. State, 265 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Ind. 1970).
87. Cf. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 542 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated on
other grounds. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See cases cited notes 88-91 infra.
88. Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1949).
89. Michener v. United States, 181 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1950).
90. State v. Miller, 292 S.W. 440 (Mo. 1927).
91. People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 794, 336 P.2d 937, 949 (1959).
92. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
93. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); United States v. Dougherty,
473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally Self-Representation 1491-94. Fear
of potential disruption is insufficient, however, to justify denial of a pro se request
asserted before trial commences. United States v. Dougherty, supra.
94. Cf. note 41 supra and accompanying text.
95. This fact apparently influenced the California Supreme Court's decision in
Sharp, which denied the existence of any federal constitutional pro se right:
In almost 200 years of constitutional interpretation and construction the Su-
preme Court has not on any occasion held that the right of self-representation
in a criminal trial is constitutionally compelled.
7 Cal. 3d at 457, 499 P.2d at 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
96. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kadish].
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a minimum the possibility that any innocent individual will be pun-
ished:0 7
It is not of crucial importance whether the individual tried is in fact
guilty or innocent, but it is of crucial concern that the integrity of the
process of ascertaining guilt or innocence never be impaired. If in
this effort to insure that none but those guilty be convicted, many
guilty go free, the price is not too great in the long view of democratic
government. If there is any consideration basic to all civilized pro-
cedures it is this .... 98
Since professional representation at trial presumably minimizes the
possibility of convicting an innocent defendant, 9 the trend has been
to find an increasing number of situations in which the availability of
counsel is a requisite of constitutional due process.'00 This expansion
97. Thus Kadish states: "This consideration [of reliable guilt-determination] gives
meaning to the great bulk of procedures that have become part of the due process
of law. . . ." Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Justice Sutherland's now classic statements in Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and ed-
ucated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrele-
vant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
The Sharp court obviously agreed: "Ideally this opportunity [to best defend against
the charges] is to be realized through the availability of competent counsel ...."
7 Cal. 3d at 461, 499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241. See also Grano 1195;
Self-Representation 1481.
Thus, the California appellate court in People v. Marcus, 133 Cal. App, 2d 579,
284 P.2d 848 (1955), reasoned that the denial of the defendant's pro se request
did not result in a miscarriage of justice since the defendant was far more "ably"
represented by counsel than he would have been had he defended himself.
100. The development of the right to counsel as a constitutionally recognized right
began with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), in which the Court held:
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital
case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable ade-
quately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness,
illiteracy or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to
assign counsel as a necessary requisite of due process of law ....
See also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1957) (unrepresented defend-
ant's conviction for murder reversed after Court learned that his voluntary guilty plea
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of the right to counsel arguably detracts from the persuasiveness of
any argument favoring a constitutional pro se right.' 0 ' Since the grant
of a pro se request is contingent upon a defendant's ability to effect
a valid waiver of counsel, 1' 2 the pro se right may be viewed as subservient
and secondary to the right to counsel. 10 3
It nevertheless can be argued that the recent expansion of the right
to counsel does not necessarily dictate for due process purposes a cor-
responding diminution of the pro se right,104 especially when one con-
siders the elements of human dignity and autonomy which influenced
the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Plattner.'0 5 The
Plattner court reasoned that the recent emphasis on the right to counsel
does not detract from the pro se right but, instead, merely represents
the "more enlightened views" of a "later generation." 0
6
was made in an attempt to "have [the trial] all over, to get to the institution ...
[in order] to be examined" since he complained of there being "something wrong
with his head"); United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Tenn.), affd,
365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966) (defendant with erratic mental history not allowed to
discharge counsel and proceed pro se).
The right-to-counsel cases, starting with Powell and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), led to the historic decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), which applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to state proceedings,
thus assuring the availability of counsel to all defendants charged with a serious
crime. The Supreme Court recently clarified Gideon in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972), which held that the right to counsel extends to all criminal defend-
ants who face possible incarceration. Thus, in order to ascertain whether counsel
must be offered pursuant to Argersinger
the trial judge and the prosecutor will have to engage in a predictive
evaluation of each case to determine whether there is a significant likelihood
that, if the defendant is convicted, the trial judge will sentence him to a jail
term.
Id. at 42 (concurring opinion).
101. See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 461, 499 P.2d 489, 497, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 241 (1972):
[Slince the right to competent counsel now has generally become available
and the quality of counsel's performance is subject to checks and supervisions,
there do not exist the same fundamental reasons for enlarging the areas of
self-representation.
102. See notes 57-66 supra and accompanying text.
103. Thus, to the Sharp court at least, the necessity of waiver weakens the cogency
of the constitutional pro se argument. 7 Cal. 3d at 453, 455, 499 P.2d at 491, 493,
103 Cal. Rptr. at 235, 237.
104. 48 N.C.L. REV. 678, 681-82 n.29 (1970).
105. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). See notes 109-21 infra and accompanying
text.
106. 330 F.2d at 274, citing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The court
continued:
Indeed, and strangely enough, there would probably have been no denial of
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Furthermore, the requirement that a valid waiver of counsel must
be effected before a pro se request will be granted arguably is simply an
inevitable consequence of the fact that the rights to defend pro se and
by counsel both protect a single, fundamental goal-the defendant's
right to effectively present his cause. 10 7 Thus the Plattner court referred
to a "single, inseparable bundle of rights, two fases [sic] of the same
coin'l 08 in which the pro se right is complementary rather than sub-
servient to the right to counsel.
In the final analysis, the constitutional pro se argument may hinge
upon the existence within the concept of due process of a "subtle and
elusive"'10 9 value that ensures respect for human dignity and autonomy.110
"[R]espect for individual autonomy requires that [a defendant] be
allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires . ...
Plattner's right to act pro se had the court not been so accustomed in these
recent years to assign Legal Aid counsel or other lawyers to defend those in-
digent defendants who had no means to pay counsel of their own choosing.
Id.
107. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
108. 330 F.2d at 276.
109. Kadish 347. See also id. at 357-58.
110. [Underscoring this value] is the notion of man's dignity, which is deni-
grated equally by procedures that fail to respect his intrinsic privacy or that
entail the imposition of shocking brutality upon him. The ideal of man's in-
dividuality, which, after all, is what infuses meaning into the concept of
freedom, is an emotional and personal as well as an intellectual affair....
Where society's sanctioned procedures exhibit a disdain for the value of the
human personality, that ideal is not likely to flourish.
Id. at 347. See also MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35, 41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 935 (1959); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denuo, 239 F. Supp. 851,
855 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 1007
(1966); Capetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913, 916 (Fla. App. 1967); Browne v. State,
24 Wis. 2d 491, 511, 129 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1964):
[D]ue process also requires that throughout the criminal process the state
must treat a defendant as a person possessing human dignity . . . and, in
most instances, a defendant would be denied this treatment if counsel were
imposed upon him against his wishes.
The Supreme Court may have been alluding to this notion when it stated in Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942), that "the Constitution
does not force a lawyer upon a defendant." See also Laub, The Problem of the
Unrepresented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 Du-
QuESNE L. Rv. 245, 256 (1964): "[Djefending a charge of crime is so personal
and serious a matter that society has no legal or moral right to invade the cloister
of the defendant's considered discretion."
111. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966). Accord, Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F. Supp. 934
(E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
946 (1959); People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 205, 417 P.2d 868, 872, 53 Cal. Rptr.
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Although the values of reliable guilt-determination and respect for
a defendant's dignity and autonomy may at times conflict,11 that
due process may encompass both values is neither illogical nor surpris-
ing. If both are encompassed by due process, 13 the pro se right argu-
ably assumes the same constitutional stature as its right-to-counsel coun-
terpart.114
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a defendant's individual
dignity in exercising his "free choice [as] a self-determining individual" 1
must be respected." 06 Thus, although "an accused must have the means
of presenting his best defense," 1 7 his right to forego counsel and de-
fend pro se "rest[s] on considerations that go to the substance of an
accused's position before the law.""'  Consequently, counsel cannot
284, 288 (1966).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated in United States
v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972):
Even if the defendant will likely lose the case anyway, he has the right-
as he suffers whatever consequences there may be-to the knowledge that it
was the claim that he put forward that was considered and rejected, and to
the knowledge that in our free society, devoted to the ideal of individual
worth, he was not deprived of his free will to make his own choice, in
his hour of trial, to handle his own case.
112. See notes 138-41 infra and accompanying text.
113. Kadish 346-47.
114. If the pro se right is not accepted as implicit in the fifth amendment due
process requirement, then constitutional pro se advocates must rely on the argument
that the ability to waive the sixth amendment right to counsel implies a constitutional
right of self-representation. The Supreme Court, however, apparently met this argu-
ment directly in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). See note 23
supra and accompanying text.
115. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942).
116. Thus the Court has stated:
To deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances in which he,
though a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice,
is to impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as
empty verbalisms.
Id. at 280.
117. Id. at 279 (emphasis added). The Sharp court recognized that state constitu-
tional provisions relating to representation at trial are designed for the "purpose of
affording to an accused the opportunity to best defend against the charges . .. ."
7 Cal. 3d at 460, 499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241 (emphasis added, original
emphasis deleted).
118, Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); cf. United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972):
[The right to waive counsel and defend pro se] is designed to safeguard the
dignity and autonomy of those whose circumstances or activities have thrust
them involuntarily into the criminal process. An accused has a fundamental
right to confront his accusers and his "country," to present himself and his
position to the jury not merely as a witness or through a "mouthpiece," but
as a man on trial who elects to plead his own cause. He is not obliged to seek
699
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be "forced" upon a competent defendant"19 when it is not desired, 120
since to do so would "imprison" the defendant in his rights.' 12  When
what counsel would record as a victory but what he sees as tantamount to con-
demnation or doubt rather than vindication.
119. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1946), in noting that the oppor-
tunity to meet an accusation contemplates the right to counsel, added the following
caveat:
This does not, however, mean that the accused may not make his own de-
fense . . . . Under appropriate circumstances the Constitution requires that
counsel be tendered; it does not require that under all circumstances counsel
be forced upon a defendant.
The Sharp court attempted to avoid this language, insisting that since counsel cannot
be compelled "under all circumstances," it obviously could be required in some circum-
stances. 7 Cal. 3d at 456, 499 P.2d at 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (original
emphasis). Assuming the Sharp court was not referring to cases in which the
accused cannot effect a valid waiver of counsel, its literal interpretation of the
Carter language is misleading. Taken in context, Carter simply seems to ex-
press the view that the right to counsel is not to be misunderstood as eliminat-
ing the possibility of a competent criminal defendant presenting his own de-
fense. The Court was not suggesting, as the Sharp court implies, that even in the
case of a competent pro se defendant there are circumstances in which counsel may
be forced upon the defendant.
120. The discussion here assumes that the defendant is competent to proceed pro
se. When he is not competent to defend himself, the defendant must be represented
by counsel. The distinction to be made is that while counsel cannot be "forced"
upon an unwilling defendant merely because the right to counsel exists, it can be
"forced" if the circumstances indicate that only through the assistance of counsel
will a fair trial be afforded. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
121. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1942):
Mhe procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights are not to be treated as
mechanical rigidities. What were contrived as protections for the accused
should not be turned into fetters ....
[1Io deny [the accused] in the exercise of his free choice of the right to
dispense with some of these safeguards . . . is to imprison a man in his priv-
ileges and call it the Constitution.
Contrary to this philosophy, however, one author advocates a system of mandatory
representation. Apparently concerned more with the number of post-trial appeals than
with the recognition of individual rights, the author's proposed system of "universal
representation" would render any right to defend pro se "non-existent." Grano
1264. Another author recommends automatic provision of counsel at the be-
ginning of every criminal case but would allow the defendant subsequently to
assert his pro se right if he so desired. Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed
Without Counsel, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1150-51 (1965). See also ABA PRojEct
ON MINImUm STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusncE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRoviING
DEFENSE SERVICES § 7.3 (Approved Draft, 1968):
No waiver of counsel should be accepted unless it is in writing and of rec-
ord. If a person who has not seen a lawyer indicates his intention to waive
the assistance of counsel, a lawyer should be provided to consult with him.
No waiver should be accepted unless he has at least once conferred with a
lawyer. If a waiver is accepted, the offer should be renewed at each subse-
quent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without coun-
sel.
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the defendant cannot establish his competence to proceed pro se, how-
ever, counsel can justifiably be "forced" upon him, 22 since allowing
a defendant to proceed without an adequate awareness of the conse-
quences of his pro se choice could cause serious harm to the defendant,
to those who share an interest in his freedom, and to the integrity of
the judicial system as a truth-determining process. Moreover, allowing
an incompetent defendant to proceed without counsel arguably would
violate constitutional due process guarantees. 2 '
B. People v. Sharp
In People v. Sharp1'2 4 the California Supreme Court was faced with
the contentions that the pro se right was of constitutional dimensions,
that the trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to proceed pro se23
122. See People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957); McCann v.
Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 282, 189 N.E.2d 143 (1963); State v. Kolocotronis, 73 Wash.
2d 92, 436 P.2d 774 (1968); Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without
Counsel, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1144-45 (1965); 48 N.C.L. Rnv. 678, 683 (1970).
Even when a defendant is not seeking to proceed pro se, counsel may be "forced"
upon him when it is clear that he is using the right to counsel merely to interfere
with and subvert the orderly administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v.
Abbamonte, 348 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966), in which
the court, after the defendant had dismissed counsel twice before trial, finally insisted on
the appointment of a third lawyer to prevent further delay. The court noted that it could
have ordered the defendant to proceed pro se on the basis of United States v. Arlen, 252
F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958), although one might question whether ordering a defendant to
proceed pro se would result in a denial of due process of law. United States v.
Abbamonte, supra, at 703. See text accompanying note 128 infra. In Relerford
v. United States, 309 F.2d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 1962), the court refused to play a
"cat and mouse" game with the defendant: "The constitutional guarantee of the
right . . . [to] counsel is not thus to be turned into a weapon whereby a defendant can
prevent his case from ever being brought to trial."
123. Cf., e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942): "LT]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits the conviction . . . of one whose trial is offensive to the common
and fundamental ideas of fairness and right . . . ." See also Smith v. O'Grady,
312 U.S. 329 (1941); People v. Lee, 249 Cal. App. 2d 234, 57 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1967);
People v. Shields, 232 Cal. App. 2d 716, 43 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1965); BEANEY 114;
Garcia, Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MIwMx L. REv. 551, 557 n.33 (1969).
124. 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
125. On the day of the trial the public defender assigned to represent the defend-
ant informed the trial court of the defendant's desire to proceed pro se. The court
made an inquiry which disclosed that the forty-eight year-old defendant had an elev-
enth-grade education. The defendant claimed to have some "knowledge of the law,"
and stated that he had already prepared briefs and planned his defense. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court viewed these contentions as "little more than bare claims ....
In short, defendant's showing consisted, in the main, of a self-serving opinion that
he could adequately represent himself." Id. at 452 n.2, 499 P.2d at 491 n.2, 103
Washington University Open Scholarship
702 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:679
was therefore erroneous, and that the error was prejudicial to the
defendant. The court concluded that its survey and analysis of several
colonial constitutions lent no historical support to the argument that
the pro se right is protected by the federal constitution,1 20 and noted
that the Supreme Court has yet to find the pro se right implicit in the
Constitution. 127 The court then held that the California constitution
could not logically be read to confer any pro se right,12 s and rejected
the view that the California due process clause compelled its recogni-
tion.129
The Sharp court's due process discussion is clothed in terms of
"fairness,"' 30 a term which may be used in either an objective or sub-
jective sense. Thus, the due process goal of reliable guilt-determination
presumes an objective fairness in the sense that what a trial seeks to
discover is the truth, while the interest in protecting individual autonomy
represents a subjective standard of fairness that favors a proceeding
that is fair in the defendant's eyes. Although the Sharp court apparently
acknowledged the potential force of subjective considerations, 1 1 it
rejected the theory that the subjective standard of fairness is protected
by due process.'3 2 The court's decision thus clearly accords priority
to the goal of achieving reliable guilt-determination through legal
representation.
Cal. Rptr. at 235 n.2. When the defendant asked the trial court to appoint advisory
counsel, stating that an attorney could be "positively" helpful to him, the court denied
the defendant's pro se request.
126. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
127. 7 Cal. 3d at 457, 499 P.2d at 494, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238. See note 95 supra
and accompanying text.
128. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
129. 7 Cal. 3d at 460, 499 P.2d at 496-97, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41.
130. The court stated: "It is clear that the assurance of a fair trial is constitu-
tionally founded in due process." Id. at 459, 499 P.2d at 496, 103 Cal. Rptr. at
240. The Supreme Court also has referred to the concept of "fairness." See, e.g.,
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942): "The public
conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice."
131. See note 78 supra. One author who favors the abolition of self-representa-
tion, see note 121 supra, nevertheless concedes: "If the accused is to lose his freedom
---or his life-perhaps it should be by the process that seems fairest to him." Grano
1195-96.
132. The court stated:
An unfair trial cannot result . . . merely because an accused, who is of a
mind to represent himself, is denied that right. The fairness of a trial is not
to be predicated on any purported right of an accused to proceedings
which are planned, directed or conducted by him ....
7 Cal. 3d at 460, 499 P.2d at 496, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
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The Sharp court emphasized that its holding was limited only to a
rejection of the constitutional pro se argument, noting that its decision
did "not purport to hold . . . that an accused is not entitled to
represent himself in a proper case, but only that such a right is not a
constitutionally protected one."'13  The court summarized the impli-
cations of this holding:
[In reviewing ... a court's [denial of] a motion to defend pro se,
we will not regard the error, if any, as one of constitutional dimen-
sions. This conclusion will relieve, in large part, the dilemma faced
by a trial court when called upon to pass on a motion for the claimed
constitutional right of self-representation under circumstances where,
to grant it, might well infringe upon the accused's constitutional right
to be represented by counsel.134
Thus the Sharp decision leaves the pro se right procedurally intact.135
C. Pro Se and the Right to Counsel as Coexisting Rights
The Sharp decision attempts to reduce the question of the constitu-
tional status of the pro se right to a determination whether due process
guarantees objective or subjective fairness. To state the question in
either-or terms, 136 however, ignores the possibility that due process
may recognize both the values of reliable guilt-determination (objective
133. Id. at 461, 499 P.2d at 497, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
134. Id. at 461-62, 499 P.2d at 498, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (footnote omitted).
135. We have heretofore set forth standards by which a trial court may de-
termine the competency of an accused who wishes to represent himself as a
condition for granting such a motion . .. and we do not now depart there-
from.
id. at 461, 499 P.2d at 497-98, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42.
The California waiver of counsel standards are set forth in People v. Floyd, 1
Cal. 3d 694, 703, 464 P.2d 64, 68, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (1970). Pursuant thereto,
a defendant's waiver will be effective only if he has an intelligent conception of
the consequences of his choice and understands the nature of the offense, the available
pleas and defenses, and the possible punishments. -Cf. notes 65-78 Supra and accom-
panying text.
136. Stating the question in either-or terms may be an erroneous formulation of
the problem. Does the Constitution guarantee only the opportunity to an objectively
fair trial, or an objectively fair trial itself? When phrased in this manner, it is
arguable that what is guaranteed is the objectively fair trial itself. See Grano
1202-03. Yet the question may be put another way: May counsel be forced
upon a defendant to ensure objectivity, or must the defendant's subjective choice
of procedure be respected? When thus reduced to terms of imposition as opposed
to choice, the objective standard loses much of its appeal. The sixth amendment
"tenders" counsel, Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175 (1946); it does not impose
it, See notes 115-21 supra and accompanying text.
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fairness) and respect for individual choice (subjective fairness), values
which may conflict in any given case.
The vast majority of criminal defendants desire counsel, 8 7 and in
these cases there obviously is no conflict at all. Similarly, no conflict
will exist when a pro se defense does not preclude an accurate deter-
ruination of guilt or innocence. In some situations, however, a pro se
defense will jeopardize the attainment of a reliable guilt-determination. 138
In these cases, the values of reliable guilt-determination and the de-
fendant's individual dignity in electing to proceed pro se clearly would
clash. Resolution of this conflict will require a balancing of the two
competing values, but such a balancing undoubtedly will be difficult.'8 0
One author suggests that what is called for is not a resolution but
rather an accommodation of the conflicting values. 140  In the process
of accommodation, the stringency of the waiver of counsel standard
employed will determine whether the two values can be reconciled or
whether the defendant's pro se request must be denied.' 4 ' Consequently,
attention must be directed towards articulating a waiver of counsel
137. See note 2 supra.
138. Thus, an innocent pro se defendant could be convicted simply because he
did not realize the intricacies of his case and hence lacked the skill and knowledge
by which to prove his innocence.
139. '"The difficulty here does not come from ignorance, but from the absence
of any standard, for values are incommensurable." L. HAND, Tin SPnIrr or LIBERTY
161 (1952). The same thought had been expressed earlier:
Thinkers have complained with justice of the lack of any formula whereby
preference can be determined when values are conflicting. There is no
common denominator to which it is possible to reduce them.
B. CARnozo, ThE PARADOXES OF LEwA. SCmNCE 56-57 (1928).
140. Kadish 348-49; cf. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
165-66 (1928):
Whe protection both of rights of the individual and of those of society rests
not so often on formulas, as to which there may be agreement, but on a cor-
rect appreciation of social conditions and a true appraisal of the actual effect
of conduct.
141. Since a defendant must effect a valid waiver of his right to counsel before
he can proceed pro se, society can attempt to assure itself of a minimally acceptable
probability of achieving reliable guilt-determination by predicting what factors will
indicate a defendant's ability to conduct an adequate defense and then setting its
waiver of counsel requirements accordingly. When a defendant cannot effect a valid
waiver of counsel, the accommodation process will have determined that in that par-
ticular case the defendant must accept counsel, and the objective of reliable guilt-
determination will not have been compromised. Yet for those defendants who effect
a valid waiver of counsel, the waiver standards will have successfully accommodated
both values to the case at hand.
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standard as a means of ascertaining the point at which the pro se
right may be exercised.
VI. PROCEDURAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PRO SE
A. Trial Procedure and Constitutional Pro Se
Implementing a constitutional pro se right arguably may involve
some alteration in present trial procedures. A court may be required
to notify the defendant of his constitutional right to defend himself,142
whereas no notice requirement attaches to the statutory pro se right.'43
Furthermore, while the wrongful denial of a statutory pro se right results
in reversal only if prejudice is shown,'44 an erroneous denial of a con-
stitutional pro se right may well require automatic reversal.' 45
142. If the Constitution does confer a pro se right, then acceptance of counsel
necessarily implies that the pro se right is being "waived." Consequently, an intelli-
gent waiver of the pro se right implies at a minimum that a defendant must be
cognizant of the right. 48 N.C.L. REv. 678, 681 (1970).
Thus, the court in United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964),
held that in all cases the court must explain to each defendant that he has the
choice between a pro se defense and the assistance of counsel, that a lawyer will
be provided if the defendant cannot afford to retain his own counsel, that although
the court strongly advises the retention of counsel, the defendant nevertheless may
seek to proceed pro se, and that the defendant will be given reasonable time to
make his choice. See also Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 370 (D.C.
Cir.). cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Supreme Court's decision in Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317
U.S. 269 (1942), requires the trial judge to inform each defendant of his constitu-
tional right to defend pro se).
143. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 911 (1959).
144. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 838 (1963); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 911 (1959); Cantor v. United States, 217 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1954).
145. Sec, e.g., United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1965). cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271
(2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 365
F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966).
While the Supreme Court indicated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
that a denial of a constitutional right need result in reversal only if prejudice is
shown, it would seem that where the right denied is the right to defend pro se,
it would be impossible to ascertain the degree of prejudice sustained. See 48 N.C.L.
REV. 678, 680 (1970); Comment, The Right to Defend Pro Se, 3 TEX. TECH. U.L. REV.
89, 93 n.19 (1971); cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961), in which the
Court, reversing a conviction in a capital case in which the defendant was without
counsel at arraignment, contrary to his right to counsel under Alabama law, remarked
that "the degree of prejudice can never be known."
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B. Procedural Efficiency and Pro Se
Although a trial judge theoretically owes little, if any, special duty
to a pro se defendant, 146 there can be little doubt that pro se
proceedings adversely affect the efficient operation of today's over-
burdened criminal trial courts.14T Thus the delay and confusion
inherent in pro se proceedings may have influenced current judicial
and legislative attitudes regarding the right. For example, the Cali-
fornia legislature clearly expressed the factors which motivated its
proposed constitutional amendment precluding any possible basis for a
constitutional pro se right: 148
[P]ersons representing themselves cause unnecessary delays in the trials
of charges against them; . . . trials are extended by such persons repre-
senting themselves; and . . . orderly trial procedures are disrupted.
Self-representation places a heavy burden upon the administration of
criminal justice without any advantages accruing to those persons
who desire to represent themselves. 1 49
The problem of procedural inefficiency is serious, and there is
dispute concerning the priority to be accorded the problem. 1 0 Yet
The possibility of automatic reversal has been criticized on the ground that
if no harm is shown but a new trial nevertheless is awarded, a defendant is benefited with
a windfall. 48 N.C.L. REv. 678, 681 (1970). The possibility of automatic reversal,
however, can be viewed more as a safeguard than a danger, for it should force the
trial courts to perform their duties diligently. Since a defendant must unequivocally
assert his desire to proceed pro se, see note 54 supra and accompanying text, the
court will be put on notice to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's
ability to effect a competent waiver of counsel. See, e.g., Burstein v. United States,
178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1949), in which the defendant clearly asserted his desire
to proceed pro se, which the trial court finally, albeit reluctantly, granted. On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court had properly heeded the defendant's pro
se request, that the defendant had effectively waived counsel, and that he therefore
would not be heard to complain that his right to counsel had been denied. Thus,
if the trial court abides by the proper judicial procedure, the necessity to resort to
automatic reversal should not arise on any large scale.
146. See notes 86-91 supra and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972):
Given the general likelihood that pro se defendants have only rudimentary
acquaintanceship with the rules of evidence and courtroom protocol, a meas-
ure of unorthodoxy, confusion and delay is likely, perhaps inevitable, in pro
se cases.
See generally Self-Representation 1509-12.
148. The constitutional amendment has been ratified. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13.
See note 16 supra.
149. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 463, 499 P.2d 489, 499, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,
243 (1972), quoting ch. 1800, § 6, [19711 Cal. Stat. 3898.
150. Chief Justice Burger, for instance, has stated:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/10
RIGHT TO DEFEND PRO SE
the time-consuming nature of a trial that meets due process standards
results from a conscious choice of adherence to rules that are fair over
expediency in the determination of guilt or innocence;' 5 ' hence, it
would not seem justifiable to avoid potential procedural inefficiencies
in trial proceedings by denying legitimate substantive rights.' 52 Thus,
allowing considerations of procedural efficiency to affect any decision
bearing upon the constitutional status of the pro se right arguably is
prohibited by the federal constitution. Indeed, the due process clause
itself may well represent a recognition of and response to man's vul-
nerability to the appeal of speed and efficiency:
[Tihe Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern
for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy govern-
ment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. 153
The challenges to our system of justice are collosal [sic] and immediate and we
must assign priorities. I would begin by giving priority to methods and
machinery, to procedure and techniques, to management and administration
of judicial resources.
Matthews, Burger's Court: Process Before Substance of Justice, St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, Nov. 5, 1972, § B, at 3, col. 3. Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia
Circuit, however, acknowledged that "efficiency is nice, but it's really beside the
point." Id. He continued:
The judicial process is at its core a fundamentally inefficient process.
This does not mean we should not do everything we can to achieve reform
and speed the process of justice. We simply should not make efficiency our
top priority.
Id. Thus it is interesting to note that in Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959), see note 26 supra, then Judge Burger con-
curred with the majority, which believed the pro se right to be merely statutory, while
Judge Bazelon dissented, insisting on the right's constitutional stature.
151. Cf. text accompanying note 153 infra.
152. The court in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir.
1972), recognizing the problems to be resolved, see note 147 supra and accompanying
text, suggested that many, if not all, of them can be eased by providing amicus
counsel for the pro se defendant:
The energy and time toll on the trial judge, as fairness calls him to articulate
ground rules and reasons that need not be explained to an experienced trial
counsel, can be relieved, at least in part, by appointment of an amicus curiae
to assist the defendant.
153. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
Vol. 1973:679]
Washington University Open Scholarship
